Built by the person who filed the NPRM comments.
Notary Cloud is built by Sviatoslav Zhuravlev. Filed public comments under FINCEN-2026-0034 and FINCEN-2026-0100 on the deployer-evidence gap that surfaces when AI participates in compliance decisions and an examiner later asks for the record.
The product exists because the structural problem under both US and EU regimes is the same. Vendor logs are not the deployer's audit trail. The records an institution owes at examination need to survive the system that produced them, signed with a key held outside the system that produced the decision, in a form an examiner can open six months later.
Operating from Spain. Direct, partner, and regulator-side conversation all welcome.
Where Notary Cloud sits in the emerging stack
The market is starting to map the stack around AI governance into distinct layers. Some companies are building intelligence generation, some orchestration, some policy definition, some runtime authority that decides at the moment of execution whether an action is allowed to become real. The picture is broadly correct as a category map.
Where I disagree is on what one of those layers actually does. The attestation, witness, continuity slot is often described as informational. As a layer that records what happened so other layers can decide.
That description undersells the layer. When an examiner asks six months later whether a control held on a given date, the answer is not informational. It determines admissibility before a regulator or a court. The runtime authority layer matters at execution time. The witness layer matters at examination time. Both are decisional. They decide at different time scales.
For the examination-time decision to hold, the record has to be externally verifiable without trusting the runtime that produced it. Tamper-evident, with an independent signing key held outside the producing runtime. Reconstructable by a third party from primitives that survive the system. That property is not produced by hardware-rooted trust alone, nor by retrospective audit. It sits across the witness layer and the cryptographic enforcement layer as a unified property.
That is the slot Notary Cloud holds.
Regulatory comments
Notary Cloud has filed public comments in U.S. rulemaking on AML/CFT and stablecoin evidence standards.
- FinCEN AML/CFT Program Rule NPRM — filed May 5, 2026docket FINCEN-2026-0034-0018
- FinCEN PPSI (permitted payment stablecoin issuer) NPRM — filed May 2026docket FINCEN-2026-0100-0013
- FinCEN AML/CFT Program Rule NPRM — supplemental comment — filed June 2, 2026docket FINCEN-2026-0034-0036
Status, plainly
- Pre-revenue. No paying customers, no completed pilots yet.
- No legal entity yet. Incorporation path is Stripe Atlas Delaware C-corp or explicit deferral, depending on first paid pilot timing.
- Engineering is solo. Backend code supports the cryptographic evidence pipeline when configured: ECDSA P-256 signing, RFC 3161 timestamping, and daily Merkle anchoring through a configured TSA endpoint. A clean runtime ECDSA proof is published at /r/prf_b2db1741f051443e.
- Public technical comments are posted on regulations.gov under FINCEN-2026-0034 and FINCEN-2026-0100.